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I. INTRODUCTION
As experienced practitioners of the art of custody litigation are
aware, the appointment of counsel for children in contested custody cases has an inconsistent and unsteady history. At best, the appointed counsel helped guide courts through the Scylla and Charybdis of parental advocacy with less pain for the innocent victims
of that difficult trip-the children. At worst, appointment of counsel for children has complicated the problem it was intended to
solve.
Attitudes towards appointment of counsel and the role the appointed counsel plays in custody cases are varied. Misunderstandings abound, and lawyers and judges define the role in widely varying ways. A 1993 report by the Counsel for Kids Subcommittee of
the Maryland State Bar Association Family Law Section noted that
courts and attorneys alike face a "lack of clarity of the purpose for
the appointment and the role of the attorney," when representing a
child-client.! Further illustrating this lack of clarity are the results of
a recent survey conducted by the Author of this Article, in which
Maryland state circuit court judges offered a wide range of opinions
as to what they believed to be the proper role of appointed
counse1. 2
1. See Counsel for Kids Subcommittee of the Maryland State Bar Association
Family Law Section, Court Appointed Lawyers for Children: Distinguishing the Roles
and Responsibilities (1993) [hereinafter Maryland Bar Report] (a report for the
bench and bar on file at the Maryland State Bar Association).
2. As background for this analysis, the results of a survey of Maryland state circuit court judges on the use, effectiveness, and future of the role of appointed
counsel for children are included. This empirical study is used to ascertain
current attitudes regarding the use of appointed counsel and as a backdrop
for comments about the potential role of appointed counsel in Maryland cus-
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Few lawyers have the skills necessary to fulfill the role of appointed counsel to children without outside assistance. This is because neither legal education nor continuing legal education programs currently equip lawyers with the skills or insight essential to
make informed decisions in custody cases.
Confusion over the role of appointed counsel must be eliminated if the legitimacy of that role is ever to be tested. The relative
success of the role of court-appointed counsel can only be measured by the ability to achieve its intended purpose. Until the purpose of appointed counsel for children 3 is commonly understood, a
discussion of appointed counsel's "success" or "failure" is unproductive, if not misleading. For this reason, this Article advocates for the
establishment of a clear definition of the role of appointed counsel
for children.
This Article sets forth a theoretical framework within which appointed counsel can make the difficult tactical decisions which must
be confronted in each custody case. An analysis of this topic is important because appointed counsel is ideally situated to force the
system to be sensitive to the long-term mental health of the child,
both during and after a custody proceeding.
II. MARYLAND LAW CONCERNING APPOINTED COUNSEL
FOR CHILDREN
A.

The Power to Appoint

In Nagle v. Hooks,4 decided in 1983, the Court of Appeals of Maryland made the appointment of counsel for a child mandatory if
there was a disputed custody issue and a question was raised as to
whether a child's statutory psychiatrist-patient privilege should be
waived. s As defined in Nagle, the role of appointed counsel was confined to making this single decision on behalf of a child: whether
tody cases. Maryland state circuit court judges offered the following definitions of appointed counsel: (1) a neutral fact finder; (2) an investigator who
will submit a report to the court either with or without counsel's opinion; (3)
a representative of the court; and (4) an advocate for the child. For a detailed
analysis of the results of this survey, see infra Appendices A and B.
3. Consistent with the legislature's intent that disabled adult children be placed
on an equal footing with minor children, allowances for appointed counsel
for minors are also applicable to disabled adult children. See Stem v. Stem, 58
Md. App. 280, 298, 473 A.2d 56, 65 (1984). For the purposes of this Article,
however, "child" will be used to mean "minor."
4. 296 Md. 123, 460 A.2d 49 (1983).
5. See id. at 129, 460 A.2d at 51-52.
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the confidentiality of the child's communications with a treating
psychiatrist should be waived so as to permit testimony by the
mental health professional. 6 The court held that when a minor is
too young to personally exercise a privilege of non-disclosure, the
court is obligated to appoint a guardian to act in the best interests
of the child.7
Moreover, the court held that the parents may not, jointly or
severally, waive or refuse to waive the privilege on behalf of the
child. s Basing its ruling on "the polestar rule of 'the best interests
of the child,' "9 the court stated that a "neutral" third party was necessary to eliminate the "very real possibility" that one or both parents might use the waiver power for self-serving ends. to Subsequent
courts have refused to extend the holding of this case and, thus,
the purpose of a "Nagle v. Hooks appointment" remains limited to
the decision to waive the child's psychiatrist-patient privilege. l1
Except when judicially mandated by a need to address a child's
testimonial privilege of confidentiality, the power to appoint counsel
to represent children in contested custody proceedings is provided
by section 1-202 of the Family Law Article of the Annotated Code of
Maryland. Section 1-202 states in pertinent part: "In an action in
which custody, visitation rights, or the amount of support of a minor child is contested, the court may: (1) appoint to represent the
minor child counsel who may not represent any party to the action;
and (2) impose against either or both parents counsel fees."12 Subti6. See id.; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-109 (1995) (creating a statutory

7.

8.

9.
10.
11.
12.

psychiatrist-patient privilege). Waiver of the privilege may not be necessary in
cases in which a court-ordered investigation by the court's medical service
leads to a written report subsequently admitted into evidence. See Newkirk v.
Newkirk, 73 Md. App. 588, 596, 535 A.2d 947,951 (1988).
See Nagle, 296 Md. at 128, 460 A.2d at 51 (" [T] he court must appoint a guardian to act, guided by what is in the best interests of the child."). For a discussion of the difficulties in determining the child's best interests, see infra Part
V.
See Nagle, 296 Md. at 128, 460 A.2d at 52. The court based its holding primarily on section 9-109(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the
Annotated Code of Maryland, which states that "'if a patient is incompetent to
assert or waive this privilege, a guardian shall be appointed and shall act for
the patient.'" Id. at 127, 406 A.2d at 51 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD.
PROC. § 9-109(c) (1995». The court found this statement to mean that appointment in such cases is mandatory. See id. at 127-28, 460 A.2d at 51.
See id. at 128, 460 A.2d at 51.
See id.
See, e.g., Leary v. Leary, 97 Md. App. 26, 46, 627 A.2d 30, 3940 (1993).
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 1-202 (1991) (emphasis added). Section 1-202 does
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tIe 8 Ouvenile Causes) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland provides additional
guidance:
[I]n addition to any requirements relating to the appointment of counsel for children, at any time during the pendency of any action where it appears to the court that the
protection of the rights of a child requires independent
representation, the court may, upon its own motion, or the
motion of any party to the action, appoint an attorney to
represent the interest of the child in that particular action.
Such actions include but are not limited to those involving
a child in need of assistance, child in need of supervision,
delinquent child, or mentally handicapped child. \3
As the language of both statutes makes clear, the appointment of
counsel in a custody or custody-related proceeding is discretionary.
It may occur either upon the court's own volition or by request of a
party. 14
Only one Maryland case has addressed the circumstances under
which a failure to appoint counsel for a child might constitute reversible error. In Levitt v. Levitt,15 the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland remanded a custody modification proceeding with a direction that counsel be appointed for the minor child pursuant to section 1-202 of the Family Law Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland. 16 The court reasoned that if counsel had been appointed,

13.
14.
15.
16.

not explicitly afford the trial court, in the absence of contested issues, the
power to appoint permanent counsel for a child unless the parties consent.
See Van Schaik v. Van Schaik, 90 Md. App. 725, 734, 603 A.2d. 908, 912 (1992).
Furthermore, this section does not authorize trial courts during divorce proceedings to appoint counsel to represent the interests of children with respect
to other issues such as replevin, conversion, or the return of property. See id.
MD. CODE ANN .. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-834(a)(l) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
Only section 3-834 specifically allows counsel to be appointed upon motion by
a party to the action. See id.
79 Md. App. 394, 556 A.2d 1162 (1989).
See id. at 404, 556 A.2d at 1166. A master of the Circuit Court of Maryland for
Montgomery County recommended that the custody be changed from joint
custody to sole custody with the father. See id. at 396, 556 A.2d at 1163. The
chancellor disagreed and continued the joint custody. See id. at 397, 556 A.2d
at 1163. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland vacated the judgment and
remanded for further proceedings. See id. at 405, 556 A.2d at 1167. For further
discussion of the role of master and chancellor, see Domingues v. Johnson,
323 Md. 486, 593 A.2d 1133 (1991).
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several deficiencies in the proceedings would have been curedY
The deficiencies the court perceived were: (1) neither the Master,
nor the Chancellor, spoke to the five-year-old boy; (2) no professional evaluation of the child had been done; (3) no one sought to
admit testimony of a family counselor who had seen both the parents and the minor child; and (4) no one suggested that a home or
school visit be conducted by an unbiased professional. IS In Levitt, a
contentious custody battle provided "a new arena for the parents to
continue their on-going controversies."19 The court emphasized that
in evaluating the child's best interests, the court should be "most
concerned" with: (1) the effect on the child of the protracted, antagonistic custody hearings; (2) the lack of input from the child or
an objective witness during the proceedings; and (3) the lack of any
advocacy on behalf of the child. 20 The Levitt court remanded the
case directing the trial court to appoint an attorney for the child in
order to give the child a voice in the proceeding and to consider a
professional evaluation of the child. 21
As precedent, Levitt may have no value beyond its unique facts.
However, the court of special appeals implied that the trial court's
failure to appoint counsel can taint the results of the court's decision under certain circumstances.
B.

The Role of Appointed Counsel

Counsel appointed to represent a child faces an immediate dilemma: the appointed counsel must decide what role to assume in
the pending custody proceeding. Absent specific direction from the
court making the appointment, the appointed counsel's only source
for guidance is section 1-202 of the Family Law Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland. 22 This section calls upon appointed counsel
simply to represent a child-client. 23 In the few cases reaching the appellate level, Maryland's courts have not attempted to define the
See Levitt, 79 Md. App. at 403, 556 A.2d at 1166.
See id.
Id. at 396, 556 A.2d at 1163.
See id. at 404-05, 556 A.2d at 1167. "Neither the Master nor the Chancellor
spoke to Chad. While not essential in every case, perceptive conversation with
him should have shed some light on how Chad felt about his parents and
grandparents." Id. at 403, 556 A.2d at 1166.
21. See id. at 405, 556 A.2d at 1167.
22. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 1-202 (1991).
23. See id. § 1-202(1).
17.
18.
19.
20.
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role of court-appointed counsel,24 The courts instead have evaluated
the appropriateness of the appointed counsel's decision on which
role to assume in situations where the trial court provided no specific guidance or parameters. 25
In John O. v. Jane 0.,26 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland considered whether appointed counsel properly represented a
child-client where the trial court did not define the appointed
counsel's role at the time of appointment. 27 At trial, the appointed
counsel took a position contrary to the stated preference of the
child based upon counsel's own independent assessment of the evidence. 28 The appointed counsel sought to resolve the conflict by informing the trial court of the child's own preferences. 29 On appeal,
the court of special appeals chose not to define what the appointed
counsel should have done. 30 Instead, the court held that, under the
facts of this case, counsel's chosen form of representation was not
inappropriate. 31
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland later sanctioned an
even narrower concept of "representation" in Leary v. Leary.32 In
Leary, appointed counsel presented the children's desires without
expressing counsel's own opinion on what was in the children's best
interests. 33 The appointed counsel did not comment on whether the
children's statements of preference were sincerely motivated or mature. 34 The appellate court characterized counsel's choice of role as
"not . . . strictly . . . an advocate of their position, but . . . a conveyor of their preferences. "35 The Leary court explained that "the
circumstances forced [appointed counsel] to take the middle
ground between advocacy and fact finding. "3~
24. See, e.g., Levitt, 79 Md. App. at 404, 556 A.2d at 1166 (stating only that the "attorney should proceed expeditiously in the manner counsel deems to be in
[the child's] best interest").
25. See infra notes 26-39 and accompanying text.
26. 90 Md. App. 406, 601 A.2d 149 (1992).
27. See id. at 435, 601 A.2d at 163.
28. See id. at 435-36, 601 A.2d at 163-64.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. 97 Md. App. 26, 627 A.2d 30 (1993).
33. See id. at 4849, 627 A.2d at 40-41.
34. See id. at 4649, 627 A.2d at 39-41.
35. [d. at 49, 627 A.2d at 41.
36. [d.
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In both John O. and Leary, appointed counsel decided that to
represent the child meant interviewing the child to ascertain the
child's point of view, and independently deciding whether the
child's stated preferences were consistent with the child's best interestsY The appointed counsel in Leary presented her client's preferences to the court without altering them to. include a contrary point
of view. 38 The appointed counsel in John 0., on the other hand, did
not trust the child's motives and, given his perception of his role,
decided to present the court with his personal point of view that
was contrary to the child's stated preferences. 39 The court of special
appeals found neither approach to be inappropriate. 40
C.

The Practical Dilemma

Unless there is a strong showing that the role selected by the
appointed counsel was detrimental to the child's best interests, it
appears that the appellate courts in Maryland will not inquire further. As intimated in cases such as Levitt and John 0.,41 the Maryland
courts have commented quite favorably on the roles played by appointed counsel in Maryland custody cases.
At present, a lawyer appointed to represent a child in a custody
proceeding is forced to define his or her own role. The absence of
standards, guidance, or direction leaves the appointed counsel in an
extremely sensitive and vulnerable position. The passions of competing litigants leave little margin or tolerance for error. As long as the
participants in the process are free to define the legitimacy or appropriateness of the appointed counsel's role, counsel's actions on
behalf of children in custody disputes are vulnerable to criticism
and attack by disgruntled or dissatisfied parents or children, in concert with lawyers who are happy to extend custody litigation into
the post-trial arena. Motions to discharge or substitute appointed
counsel, appeals, and even claims of malpractice, will be the everincreasing by-products of a system which leaves appointed counsel
to make decisions without relying upon any authoritative guidance.
These threats are likely to deter the appointed counsel's enthusiasm
as well as the effectiveness of his or her advocacy. Such threats also
add another layer of contentiousness to custody proceedings, al37. See id.; John 0., 90 Md. App. at 436, 601 A.2d at 163-64; see also supra notes 2636 and accompanying text.
38. See Leary, 97 Md. App. at 49, 627 A.2d at 41.
39. See John 0., 90 Md. App. at 435-36, 601 A.2d at 163-64.
40. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 15-31 and acco~panying text.
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ready overburdened with the conflicts triggered by the contesting
parents. In this context, a discussion of the appointed counsel's
"role" is not merely an academic exercise. It has practical implications which affect the potential contributions the appointed counsel
can make to the system.
III.

SURVEY OF MARYLAND CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES

Appointed counsels are currently deployed in a variety of roles
in Maryland custody cases. In an effort to gauge judicial perceptions
regarding the role of appointed counsel in custody cases,42 a survey
was conducted of Maryland circuit court judges. 43
Although most judges indicated that appointed counsel should
act as a "representative" of the child, a significant number of judges
consider the roles of "a neutral fact-finder" and "a representative of
the court" also to be appropriate. Further, many judges stated that
they define the role of appointed counsel differently from case to
case. The type of "representation" which judges believe appointed
counsel should offer likewise varies. Moreover, judges' expectations
regarding the independence of appointed counsel from the court,
or from the parents, varies according to the nature of the case.
Despite differences of opinions as to which role the appointed
counsel should assume, almost all judges surveyed believe that the
appointed counsel should routinely seek outside expert evaluations
of the child. Many judges also responded that counsel should continue to have contact with the child for a period of time after the
final settlement. This indicates that many judges see the role of appointed counsel for children as fundamentally different in nature
from that of other legal representatives. Indeed, judges consistently
acknowledged that children have different needs and capacities
than adult clients. Appointed counsel must recognize these differences and adapt to them in every case.
IV.

DEFINING THE ROLE

The court's authority to appoint a representative of the child's
interest stems from the court's inherent power to serve as parens patriatf'4 to mi~or children in custody proceedings. If the appointing
court is not explicit about the nature and extent of the responsibili42. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
43. For an abridged account of this survey see infra Appendices A and B.
44. Traditionally, parens patriae refers "to [the] role of [the] state as sovereign and
guardian of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles.» See BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).

526

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 26

ties it intends a child's advocate to undertake, the statutory authorizations for the appointment of counsel may restrict, rather than
broaden, the court's inherent powers.
The Counsel for Kids Subcommittee of the Family Law Section
of the Maryland State Bar Association (Counsel for Kids Subcommittee) has identified the roles "most widely required" in custody
cases as: (1) Nagle v. Hooks waiver; (2) investigator; and (3) guardian
ad litem. 45 The single task contemplated for an appointee under a
Nagle v. Hooks appointment is defined by case law. 46 The role of an
investigator is created by the court's exercise of its inherent power. 47
Therefore, the extent of the investigator's role needs to be defined
by the appointing court. 48 Counsel appointed to "represent" a child
under section 1-202 of the Family Law Article of the Annotated
Code of Maryland49 must undertake the tasks which the term represent connotes, unless a more task-specific directive is set out in the
order of appointment. 50 On its face, the directive to represent a
child implies an involvement which is more extensive than the
other roles. If a court deems it appropriate for appointed counsel
to undertake a narrower role than the term represent connotes, the
appellate cases indicate that it is incumbent upon the appointing
court to so indicate in its initial order of appointment. 51 An examination of each of these roles follows.
A.

Task Related Definitions

1. Waiver
A counsel appointed to determine whether a child's psychiatrist-patient privilege should be waived is, by definition, confined to
that narrow responsibility. This form of appointment requires only
that counsel inform the court of a single decision. 52 It does not, on
its face, require the appointed counsel to otherwise participate in
the custody proceeding. Thus, the appointed counsel's opportunity
or ability to influence the outcome of the legal process is limited to
the impact of this singular decision.
45. See Maryland Bar Report, supra note 1.
46. See supra Part III.
47. See Maryland Bar Report, supra note 1, at 3.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Cf. id.
MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 1-202 (1991).
See Maryland Bar Report, supra note 1, at 2 ..
See, e.g., Nagle v. Hooks, 296 Md. 123, 460 A.2d 49 (1983).
See supra Part ILA.
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On closer inspection, however, the Nagle v. Hooks role is more
complex than it first appears. Whether it is appropriate to waive the
privilege and permit a child's therapist to testify in the proceedings
depends upon what goals the appointed counsel is trying to accomplish. It is often difficult to determine the child's best interests. For
example, if the child has been in therapy, and the disclosure of the
therapist's thoughts and opinions in a court proceeding will jeopardize the future therapeutic relationship, should counsel refuse to
waive the child's psychotherapist-patient privilege? Counsel must
balance the negative impact of possible loss of the future therapeutic relationship against the possible negative impact of excluding information which may be relevant, or perhaps even crucial to the
custody proceedings. If the appointed counsel in the Nagle v. Hooks
role must take the child's best interests into account, the appointed
counsel must determine where those interests lie. That is, counsel
must undertake a complete factual inquiry to make an intelligent
and informed decision.
The Nagle v. Hooks role, however, does not presently contemplate any disclosure of the appointed counsel's thought processes to
the court. There appears to be no judicial expectation that the appointed counsel will provide the court with a factual justification for
a waiver decision rooted in the child's best interests. The only expectation is that a decision will be made and revealed to the court
and to all of the participants in the custody dispute. 53
2. Fact Investigation
Courts sometimes appoint counsel as an independent investigator. Typically, courts anticipate that counsel will conduct a factual
investigation, including an inquiry into the child's preference. Such
investigation occurs if the child's age is appropriate and the topic is
relevant. Counsel must then submit "a report to the court. 55 The
court has the power to appoint someone to fulfill this limited role,
54

53. In fact, the Nagle court may have done significant harm to the role of appointed counsel by defining appointed counsel as "neutral." See Nagle, 296
Md. at 128, 460 A.2d at 51. A more apt definition would have been "not aligned with either named party," or "representative of the child's interests."
The Nagle court intended for counsel to: (1) independently determine the
child's best interests in the waiver of privilege issue; and (2) use these best interests as the basis for decision of the waiver issue. See id. at 127-28, 460 A.2d
at 51-52.
54. See Maryland Bar Report, supra note 1, at 3.
55. See id.
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and the role is often assumed by non-Iawyers. 56
Significantly, the obligation to report facts to the court enhances the opportunity to influence the outcome of the legal process. Counsel appointed for this purpose does not represent the
child. 57 The appointed counsel's principal allegiance is to the court,
whose need for neutral information generated and defined the appointment in the first place. 58 Counsel appointed for this purpose is
neutral, in contrast to the other self-interested parties in the custody
litigation. The gathering and reporting of facts, however, is not a
neutral process. The observations of the neutral fact-finder are
filtered through his or her personal life history, experiences, biases,
prejudices, and judgments. For this reason, the findings of a neutral
fact-finder ought to be a subject of cross-examination by the other
litigants, and an exploration into personal history and background
should be as legitimate and permissible as with any other fact
witness.
B. Advocate
Absent a narrower directive from the appointing court, counsel
appointed under section 1-202 of the Family Law Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland is called upon to represent a child. 59
Neither case law, nor the rules of professional conduct, offer more
specific guidance to assist appointed counsel in deciding how to undertake the tasks of representation.
An advocate for a child can represent a child's interests more
effectively than one whose role is limited by the court. An .advocate
has the advantage of choice, for there are a variety of courses of action from which counsel may select. 60 The skill of counsel's fulfillment of this role depends upon: (1) his or her being aware of all
available choices; and (2) having a clearly-defined sense of
purpose. 61
.
The most effective course of action may involve negotiating
with all the parties involved, assuming a mediating role, counseling
a misguided child, bringing outside influence or assistance to bear,
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id.
See id.
See id.

See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 1-202 (1991); see also Maryland Bar Report, supra
note 1, at 2.
60. See generally Maryland Bar Report, supra note 1, at 2-3.
61. This is a standard by which he or she can predict, and later evaluate, whether
a course of action will lead to the desired outcome.

1997]

Appointed Counsel

529

or utilizing the full range of trial skills to advocate on behalf of a
child in the courtroom. 62 However, unless the role of the representative of the child is broad enough to include all of these responsibilities, the representative's opportunity to be effective is significantly limited.
If the appointed counsel's role in representing a child is limited to fact-finding, whether by court directive or by the appointed
counsel's own choice of role, counsel's ability to resolve the custody
problem on behalf of a client is severely constrained. This narrow
definition of "role" strips the appointed counsel of many tools that
might otherwise positively affect the outcome of the litigation. For
example, the appointed counsel cannot negotiate, attempt to bifurcate the custody proceeding and sever it from a contentious and
time-consuming financial dispute, nor use his or her role as the
child's attorney to influence a settlement. In short, this definition or
concept of an attorney's role affords him or her access to only a
very narrow and constricted scale of opportunity.
The role of an advocate subsumes the narrower definitions of
role outlined by the Counsel for Kids Subcommittee. 63 An appointed counsel who effectively represents a child must not be confined to the privilege issue, nor should the opportunity for advocacy
be limited to fact investigation and neutral reporting to the court.
The role of advocate must incorporate all of these and more.
The Counsel for Kids Subcommittee uses the term "guardian
ad litem"64 to describe a child's appointed representative under section 1-202 of the Family Law Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland. 65 The term guardian ad litem, has historical roots which imply a loyalty to the court greater than, or different than, the loyalty to
the client. 66 This is inconsistent with a lawyer's duty when he or she
is called upon to represent a child's interests. The primary duty of
loyalty of a representative of a child should be to the child, not to
62. Cf Maryland Bar &part, supra note 1, at 2.
63. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
64. See Maryland Bar &port, supra note 1. A "guardian ad litem" is a "special guardian appointed by the court in which a particular litigation is pending to represent an infant, ward or unborn person in that particular litigation." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 706 (6th ed. 1990). The use of that terminology is unfortunate and is rejected by this Author.
65. See Maryland Bar &part, supra note 1, at 2-3 (citing MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw
§ 1-202 (1991».
66. See Ellen K. Solender, The Guardian Ad Litem: A Valuable Representative or an Illusory Safeguard?, 7 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 619 (1976).
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the court. Thus, the term guardian ad litem creates confusion in an
arena where the avoidance of confusion is the immediate objective.
On the other hand, the use of the term "represent" is distinct
and unambiguous. "Represent" typically describes the full range of
actions which lawyers perform on behalf of their clients. Appointed
counsel is not a passive overseer in the case, nor a representative of
the court, regardless of the court's perception. When representing a
child, counsel should maintain his or her status as an independent
advocate. Although the lawyer may choose to posture himself or
herself as a "neutral fact-finder" in any given case, that choice
should be made only as a deliberate strategy designed to accomplish the purpose of his or her representation of the client. Appointed counsel must remember that fact-finding is but one phase
of the appointed counsel's role as an advocate representing their
client's interests. Further, appointed counsel should not report to
the court, nor should appointed counsel become a witness who can
later be subjected to cross-examination.
Viewed from a broader plane, the purpose of the appointed
counsel's representation of children is to bring about a solution to
a custody problem which is consistent with the best interests of the
child. This purpose is most likely to be achieved if appointed counsel acts as an advocate, because only then can counsel's impact be
felt at all stages of the custody proceeding. At each stage of the proceeding, the lawyer's task is to make the legal system respond creatively and promptly to serve the best interests of the child.
Appointed counsel's tasks are multi-faceted, and they require a
knowledge beyond that which is typically developed in a traditional
"legal" education. When assuming the role of appointed counsel,
one must either grapple alone with unfamiliar mental health concepts or collaborate with mental health professionals. Even such collaboration will not always provide all the answers. The theoretical
constructs of the mental health professional provide the appointed
counsel with some guidance, but there is no consistent theoretical
framework to guide either the lawyer or the mental health professional through the murky area of child custody.67 Rather, appointed
counsel must gather all of the information available, and then make
informed, intelligent decisions.
When handled properly, the role of appointed counsel can
prove invaluable in a court proceeding. Certainly, the interests of
67. See gmeraUy Diane Trombetta, Shared Parenting: Is it Working?, 27 FAM. &
CIUATION CTs. REv., Dec. 1989, at 17-20.
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the child are integral to any divorce proceeding; they are, however,
often ignored. 68 Appointed counsel for children can help to fill this
gap and offer children the protection that they deserve.

V. ADVOCACY-DEFINING THE CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS
To be effective, the appointed counsel for a child must undertake the extremely difficult task of defining the "best interests" of
the child, and take appropriate action to achieve this goal in a manner which is the least detrimental to that interest.
A.

Theoretical Guidelines

Divorce proceedings can have profound, lasting effects on children. 69 Therefore, every attempt ought to be devoted to minimizing
these negative effects on children in custody proceedings. Two dis68. See Levitt v. Levitt, 79 Md. App. 394, 556 A.2d 1162 (1989) (holding that ap-

pointment of an attorney for the child of the parties was necessary because
the child's interests were being ignored because the parents advocated only
for their own interests).
69. See 'Christopher F. Clulow, Divorce as Bereavement: Similarities and Differences, 28
FAM. & CONCIUATION CTS. REv., June 1990, at 19-22. The Author argues that
both divorce and death are major changes that introduce discontinuities in
people's lives. See id. at 19. They both involve coming to terms with loss and
the search for new meanings. See id. The long-term effects of divorce depend
on how the breakdown of the marriage has been handled by the partners, by
the children, if any, and by the community in discharging its legal and social
responsibilities. See id. The bonds that hold people in marriage (e.g., economic, legal, or emotional ties) tend to be easier to deal with when death occurs than in the case of a divorce. See id. at 21. Likewise, the consequences for
children of divorce are often more serious than when one parent dies. The
two chief components of grief, sorrow and anger, are expressed differently according to whether a marriage ends in death or divorce. See id. Moreover, social and religious rituals are supportive of the bereaved, whereas no such social and psychological provision is made for those whose marriages end in
divorce. See id.; see also Richard Wolfman & Keith Taylor, Psychological Effects of
Custody Disputes on Children, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L., Fall 1991, at 399417. Wolfman
and Taylor report on a subset of data from an ongoing longitudinal study of
95 children and their parents from 43 divorcing families, 27 of whom were involved in child custody disputes, and 16 of whom had settled the issue out of
court. See id. at 399. Contested children exhibited significantly greater internality of control orientation than the normative sample. See id. Contested children's test scores also suggested significantly less separation anxiety and significantly more positive family concept than the uncontested group at post-test.
See id. It is suggested that these unanticipated findings may indicate that certain aspects of custody litigation, its destructive potential notwithstanding, may
actually contribute to children's development of adaptive coping strategies. See
id.
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tinct views have dominated the debate on what constitutes the "best
interests" of the child in a divorce proceeding. 70 Three noted child
psychologists, Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit,
advanced the view that children are better off in the long run if
one parent has complete control after the custody dispute,11 The
dominance of this theory was eroded, however, when mental health
professionals and courts began to question the efficacy of this solution.72 Numerous mental health professionals began to advocate the
prevailing need for a strong, continuing relationship between the
child and each parent,13 To date, neither side in this debate has
gained universal acceptance,74 and indeed, individual circumstances
may necessitate one approach over the other in any given case.
Most importantly, a court appointed attorney must be familiar with
each possibility to make an informed decision regarding a particular
child-client's best interests.

1. The Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit View

a. Summary
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit proposed that custody decisions
should: (1) safeguard the child's need for continuity of relationships; (2) reflect the child's, not the parents', sense of time; and (3)
take into account the law's limited capacities to supervise interpersonal relationships or to make long range predictions. 75 They recognized, however, the difficulty that parents have in maintaining a
constructive relationship with one another following a divorce. 76
Therefore, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit posited that custody should
be awarded to the parent who, based on the above factors, repre70. See Deborah A. Luepnitz, A Comparison of Maternal, Paternal, and Joint Custody:
Understanding the Varieties of Post-Divorce Family Life, 9 J. OF DIVORCE, Spring
1986, at 1-12.
71. See JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979).
72. See Joan B. Kelly, Longer-term Adjustment in Children of Divorce: Converging Findings and Implications for Practice, 2 J. FAM. PSYCHOL., Dec. 1988, at 119-40. But see
Sheila J. Kuehl, Against Joint Custody: A Dissent to the General Bullmoose Theory, 27
FAM. & CONCILIATION CTs. REv., Dec. 1989, at 37-45; Leonard S. Jacobson & Alice G. Dvoskin, Is Joint Custody in the Child's Best Interest?, 25 MD. BAR J., Nov./
Dec. 1992, at 11.
73. See Michael Benjamin & Howard H. Irving, Shared Parenting: Critical Review of
the Research Literature, 27 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv., Dec. 1989, at 21-22.
74. See id.
75. See GoLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 71, at 31-52.
76. See id.
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sents the least detrimental alternative. 77 Moreover, the preferred
pattern of custody and visitation should maximize the child's opportunity to maintain a continuing relationship with a primary "psychological" parent.18 Principal responsibility for nurturing the child's
best interests should reside in the "psychological" parent. 79 In addition, there should be minimal legal intervention once the initial
custody determination has been made. 80
b.

Controversies

The approach of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit sparked several
controversies. The first controversy centered on whether it is in the
child's best interests to make custody decisions final, that is, not
subject to continuous review or court involvement. 8t Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit argued that making custody determinations final
would safeguard the child's need for continuity and provide the
child with the same rights to parental authority as are given to children in two-parent families. 82
The second controversy involved whether decisions regarding
visitation should be under the exclusive control of the custodial parents. 83 Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit contended that the courts' limited capacity to supervise interpersonal relationships, combined with
the need to establish a stable source of authority, justified the conclusion that the custodial parent ought to exercise this function. 84
77. See id.
78. See id. at 19. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit define the psychological parent as
"one who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs." Id. at 98.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 98-99. The California Supreme Court has followed Goldstein, Freud,
and Sol nit in defining de facto parents: the court has held that although de
facto parents may appear in proceedings involving child placement, they are
not "parents" under applicable statutes; thus, they may not be awarded custody unless awarding custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child.
See In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244, 254 (Cal. 1974) (en banc).
81. See John Batt, Child Custody Disputes & the Beyond the Best Interest Paradigm: A
Contemporary Assessment of the Goldstein/Freud/Solnit Position and the Group's
Painter v. Bannister Jurisprudence, 16 NOVA L. REv. 621, 632 (1992); see also HoMER H. ClARK, THE LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 598-601 (1968). See generallyJoseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, 92 YALE L. J. 219 (1982).
82. See Goldstein, supra note -h, at 38.
83. See Batt, supra note 81, at 627-28.
84. See Goldstein, supra note 71, at 38.
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The remaining controversy pertained to the proper role of the
child's legal representative. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit expressed
concern about positioning legal counsel between parents and children. 85 They argued that once the court makes a determination, the
role of the appointed counsel ends: 86
In designating a custodial parent, the court expresses
the state's confidence that this particular adult has the
greatest capacity among those available to fulfill the child's
needs, including his need to be protected from and represented before the law. To do otherwise-to impose continuing legal counsel for the child as a conditjon of a disposition-is to undermine that confidence and threaten, rather
than promote, family integrity.87
As Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit subsequently clarified, giving the
custodial parent a primary role in determining visitation should be
perceived not as a position opposed to visitation, but as the best way
to maximize the benefits of the continuity of care, autonomy, and
authority of the custodial parent in the child's long-term best
in terests. 88

2.

Recent Research Findings

There is significant disagreement on whether a child's conceptualization of a primary psychological parent, as implied in this approach, is determinative of the child's best interests. 89 Indeed, subsequent research on children of divorce has demonstrated that the
child's interests may be best served when: (1) contact is maintained
with the non-custodial parent; (2) both parents cooperate in the
parenting function; (3) parents have a continuing positive relationship with one another; and (4) the child does not suffer from a
feeling of abandonment at the decreasing interest and involvement
of the non-custodial parent. 90
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 30-52.
See id. at 31-52.
See, e.g., Loyola Association of Women Law Students, Symposium on Joint Custody: Seeking Solomon's Wisdom, 5-6 (1984) (arguing that, notwithstanding the
theory of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, many child welfare professionals believe the child will adjust to post-divorce life more smoothly through significant contact with both parents).
90. See Kelly, supra note 72, at 119; see also Trombetta, supra note 67, at 18.
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This research, coupled with an increasing emphasis on sexual
equality, has led to a preference for various forms of shared parental responsibility.91 These alternatives to sole custody differ from one
another in the degree of shared legal responsibility they vest in parents, but they generally attempt to assure continuity of contact with
both parents by decreasing the parent's perceptions that the custody dispute is a contest with a winner and a loser.92
While this approach has merit in its sensitivity to a child's perception of abandonment by a non-custodial parent, there are also
negative factors to consider. For example, joint custody arrangements are difficult to sustain because they demand a great deal of
mutual respect on the part of the parents. 93 However, shared parental decision-making creates an additional forum for their continued
hostile entanglement. 94

3. Benedek and Benedek Theory
Two prominent commentators, Elisa P. Benedek and Richard S.
Benedek, have argued that no single custody solution is applicable
to all situations, but rather, different circumstances call for different
custody arrangements. 95 Accordingly, they have proposed a set of
factors to help determine whether joint custody is appropriate in a
particular case: (1) the level of the parents' desire for joint custody;
(2) the maturity of the parents; (3) the parents' commitment to the
child's positive development; (4) the parents' predisposition to
honor their agreement; (5) the proximity of the parents' residencies; and (6) the child's desire for continuing contact with both parents. 96 These criteria address the motivations, attitudes, and intentions of the parents. 97
91. See, e.g., Trombetta, supra note 67, at 18-19; see also Benjamin and Irving, supra
note 73, at 21-33.
92. See Richard B. PesikofI & Bette S. PesikofI, Child Custody in the 80's: The Effects
of Divorce on Childhood and Teenagers and the Concept of Joint Custody, 23 FAM. &
CONCIUATION CTS. REv., June 1985, at 53-55.
93. See Kuehl, supra note 72, at 3745.
94. See id.
95. See Elisa P. Benedek & Richard S. Benedek, Joint Custody: Solution or Illusion?,
136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1540, 1543 (1979).
96. See id.
97. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change
in Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARv. L. REv. 727 (1988) (noting that anecdotal
evidence indicates that many women consider joint custody a "loss" of the custody battle, while many men view it as a victory; as a result, women often bargain away property and support benefits in order to avoid the risk of losing
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The Benedeks assume that the parents, regardless of the nature
of the custody settlement, can determine whether or not continued
contact with both of them will be a constructive reality.98 Where
these factors imply that a joint custody arrangement is not feasible,
continuing contact with both parents is not likely to be beneficial
and may even be harmful to the child. 99
An alternative is to impose court ordered visitation when the
non-custodial parent fails to remain involved. loo Court orders, however, are not a realistic solution because they rarely succeed in compelling parents to have time for their child, or to continue to recognize and honor their responsibilities. lOl
The standard of the child's best interests is defined differently
under the alternative, and sometimes conflicting, approaches of
joint and sole custody. Furthermore, within each theoretical approach, numerous smaller distinctions present themselves. The
child advocate's position, in each case, is likely to be consistent with
some theoretical approaches and inconsistent with others. For instance, a theoretician who attaches a greater value to the relationship between two siblings might conclude that it is sufficiently important to both children that they should not be separated. I02 Given
one child's age and the intensity of one child's stated preference, it
might be equally legitimate to conclude that the children should be
separated. There is no magic formula or authoritative theoretical
guidance upon which counsel can invariably rely.
Because of the ambiguity inherent in determining a child's best
interests, many issues are left unresolved. Namely, who should detheir children).
98. See Benedek & Benedek, supra note 95, at 1543.
99. See generally Trombetta, supra note 67, at 17-19. As Ms. Trombetta points out,
research provides no clear answer as to how the effectiveness of shared
parenting by divorced couples relates to sole physical custody of children. See
id. at 18. What can be deduced from the research is that certain factors seem
to enhance children's adjustment to divorce: (1) low levels of parental conflict; (2) the quality of the relationship with the noncustodial parent; (3) environmental (especially economic) stability; and (4) the psychological well-being
of the children's primary caretakers. See id. By looking at the full range of political, social, and economic implications of the recent trend in divorce laws
toward shared parenting, it becomes clear that evaluating the success of joint
parenting is extremely difficult. See id. at 18-19.
100. See id.
101. See Goldstein, supra note 71.
102. See Stuart Fine, Children in Divorce, Custody and Access Situations: An Update, 28 J.
CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY & ALLIED DISCIPUNES, May 1987, at 361-64.
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cide what is the most appropriate custody arrangement, and under
what circumstances, if any, a child's advocate is entitled to disagree
with a mental health professional's assessment of the child's best interests. One circumstance in which it may be legitimate to do so is
when the advocate possesses more facts than those relied upon by
the mental health professiona1. 103 Such a situation is not uncommon, partly because of the institutional constraints placed upon
mental health professionals in their fact-gathering process, and
partly because mental health professionals' approaches to "factfinding" and "reality" are different than that of a legally trained
advocate.
The incorporation of mental health theories by appointed
counsel does not simplify the appointed counsel's task. Indeed, it
often intensifies counsel's dilemma. It is beyond the scope of this
Article to attempt to decide these complex issues for this discussion
is intended only to introduce the reader to the conflicting theories
on "best interests," and to emphasize the need for further education, thought, and sensitivity.
B.

The Client

s Preferences

A lawyer called upon to represent a child has a client who is either: (1) unable to express a preference about his or her future; (2)
unwilling to express a preference about his or her future; (3) expressing an ill-advised or immature preference about his or her future; or (4) expressing a mature and intelligent preference about
his or her future. Accordingly, the appointed counsel must tailor
his or her role based on the child's ability and capacity to make a
choice about custody. Accomplishing this task is not easy. This, however, is a practical problem which must be addressed in every case if
counsel intends to proceed with a clear sense of purpose.
At present, there are no standards which give concrete guidance. The comment to Rule 1.14 of the Maryland Rules of Profes103. See, e.g., Theresa Abrams, The Influence of Family Disruption on Clinician Bias in
the Assessment of Children, 11 J. DIVORCE, Spring-Summer 1988, at 189-205.
Abrams studied the correlation between the clinicians' life experiences such
as clinician's biases, and whether they came from intact marriages, high-conflict marriages, or recently divorced marriages. See id. at 189. She concluded
that the largest correlation was among clinicians who had themselves undergone marital disruption. These clinicians were more likely to find normal psychological adjustment in the child, and were less likely to recommend further
treatment for the child. See id.
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sional Conduct addresses the problem, but does not present any
real solution:
The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters. When the client is a minor or suffers from a mental
disorder or disability, however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects.
In particular, an incapacitated person may have no power
to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client
lacking legal competence often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being. Furthermore, to
an increasing extent the law recognizes intermediate degrees of competence. For example, children as young as
five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve,
are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight
in legal proceedings concerning their custody. 104
The American Bar Association Model Code of Professional
Conduct offers equally convoluted guidance. Ethical Consideration
7-11 states that: "[t]he responsibilities of a lawyer may vary according to the intelligence, experience, mental condition or age of a client."I05 Ethical Consideration 7-12 provides that:
[a]ny mental or physical condition of a client that renders
him incapable of making a considered judgment on his
own behalf casts additional responsibilities upon his lawyer
. . . . If a client under disability has no legal representative,
his lawyer may be compelled in court proceedings to make
decisions on behalf of his client. 106
Similarly, the Juvenile Justice Standards provide that counsel in a juvenile case should act as counsel would in any other case. I07 None
of these pronouncements give the lawyer any relief from the need
to struggle for a decision-making framework. In the line of fire,
however, counsel must take a position, for neutrality has no place in
advocacy.
104. See MD. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.14 ernt.
105. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-11 (1982).
106. Id. at EC 7-12 (1982).
107. See ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, Counsel far Private Parties (1990).
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The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (American
Academy) has published Standards for Attorneys and Guardians Ad Litem in Custody or Visitation Proceedings. 108 It addresses the dilemma of
client preference and offers a solution worthy of serious consideration by any careful practitioner. These standards can be summarized
into the following main points. First, if a minor is "unimpaired,"
then the advocate's role is identical to the role of an advocate representing an unimpaired adult.109 If there is a rational and reasonable basis for the client's choice, it is the responsibility of the attorney to follow the client's instructions whether or not he or she
believes it to be in the client's best interests. llo Second, if a client is
"impaired," the role changes. Third, the decision of whether a client is "impaired" or "unimpaired" is to be made by the lawyer, not'
by the court.llt Fourth, when a client, by virtue of his or her impairment, is unable to set the goals of representation, the lawyer shall
not advocate a position with regard to the outcome of the proceeding or issues contested during the litigation. ll2 Finally, there is a rebuttable presumption that minors age twelve or older are
unimpaired. ll3
In contrast, the Counsel for Kids Subcommittee has taken a
more flexible approach:
At trial, a guardian may advocate a pOSItIOn that differs
from the wishes of the child. Where the child is able to express a preference, it is essential that the guardian make
the preference known or sees that the child has the opportunity to convey his or her thoughts directly to the Court.
The guardian should be present at any time the child is either testifYing or in chambers with the Judge. ll4
If a child-client is not sufficiently mature to understand and articulate his or her own desires, a question arises as to whether it is
appropriate for appointed counsel to advocate any position on be108. See Representing Children: Standards for Attorneys and Guardians Ad Litem in Cus-

109.
110.

111.
112.

113.
114.

tody or Visitation Proceedings, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAws. 1 (Summer 1995)
[hereinafter Standards].
See id. at 2.3.
See id. at 2.4.
See id. at 2.1.
See id. at 2.7. The lawyer should not submit a trial memo or argue the case,
although the lawyer should otherwise participate in the litigation.
See Standards, supra note 108, at 2.2.
See Maryland Bar Report, supra note 1, at 2-3.
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half of the child. Under these circumstances, the American Academy would restrict counsel's role to fact investigation, counseling
the client, negotiation, and generally monitoring, and influencing
the course of conduct of the custody litigation. liS
While it is true that lawyers are not trained by education or experience to make decisions about a child's best interests, lawyers are
trained to gather facts, evaluate information, exercise judgment,
and make decisions based on the information. With adequate training, the use of outside resources, and the acquisition of specialized
knowledge, the appointed counsel can effectively advocate for the
child's best interests. The American Academy's suggestion that the
appointed counsel's role be restricted to something less than, or
short of, courtroom advocacy is an unfortunate attempt at solving
the problem. If a lawyer for a child is stripped of the power to advocate a position on behalf of his or her client, the lawyer's derivative
power to exercise any authoritative control over the course or outcome of the custody litigation would be significantly limited. The
appointed counsel's ability to obtain information, to negotiate solutions of interim issues such as visitation and selection of schools, or
to coerce contentious litigants into agreeing to a custody evaluation,
are by-products of the appointed counsel's power to advocate a position which may influence the outcome of the custody litigation.
The appointed counsel's role in this situation, however, is that
of an advocate, not of a witness. As an advocate, the appointed
counsel's position is only as effective or as persuasive as the evidence the appointed counsel can produce in support of his or her
position. The appointed counsel does not, and should not, testify.
Furthermore, it is improper and immaterial for the appointed counsel to interject his or her personal opinion into the decision-making
process. Courts are well-equipped to maintain the distinction between personal opinion and fact in the application of the traditional rules which regulate the introduction of evidence and the
permissible scope of oral argument.
One of the most troubling dilemmas for legally trained advocates of children occurs when the advocate's personal beliefs about
the child's best interests contradict the child's own preference. Unfortunately, this is a common problem in litigated custody disputes.
Children develop and verbalize preferences for many reasons-both
sound and unsound. At one end of the spectrum is the child who is
mature enough to know his or her own needs and to express an in115. See, e.g., Standards, supra note 108.
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telligent preference; at the other end of the spectrum is the child
whose preference is the product of parental control. Parental control and influence in custody disputes may range in quality from
gentle persuasion to insidious and destructive coercion. Such attempts to influence children generally cause them to become unknowing surrogates for one side. This phenomenon is not confined
to any particular age. The difficulty, therefore, arises when the child
has expressed a preference, and the appointed counsel disagrees
with the child. Is counsel then duty-bound to present the child's
preference to the court and support the child's choice throughout
the proceedings?
Some would consider it an attorney's duty to advocate a client's
preference in all situations. This "rule" certainly resolves the appointed counsel's ethical, and perhaps p.ersonal, dilemma. It is neat,
clean, and unambiguous. If a child is to have a voice in charting his
or her future, it should be his or her own voice. This appealing sentiment, however, is more beguiling than it is helpful. A child's
stated preference is still the statement of a child. A child should be
allowed to participate in the process and have his or her views considered. However, in light of the system's purpose in custody disputes, including its concern about the family unit after a divorce, it
seems unwise to unleash, within the dispute resolution mechanism,
another force bent upon harm. To hamstring a child's advocate by
requiring the active pursuit of an ill-motivated, misguided, or misunderstood preference accomplishes little and carries within it a
great potential for harm, not only to the child, but also to the parents as well.
Thus, if the role of appointed counsel is to achieve its full potential, it is a mistake to impose rigid definitions or parameters
upon that role. Rather, it is preferable to rely upon the appointed
counsel's exercise of good judgment, subject to the scrutiny and
controls inherent in the legal system and the rules of evidence. Appointed counsel must be given latitude in deciding how much
weight is to be given a child's preference in any given case. It
should not be the court's decision, nor should it result from a narrow definition of the appointed counsel's role. In that respect, the
flexible approach of the Counsel for Kids Subcommittee is a wise
solution.
It should be permissible, although not mandatory, for the appointed counsel to advocate his or her view of the client's "best interests" in cases where the client is too young, too immature, or is
unwilling to express his or her view. Moreover, if a client has a pref-
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erence or point of view, the appointed counsel should never be
bound by that point of view regardless of the age of the child. However, if the appointed counsel determines that the child's preference is consistent with the child's best interests, the appointed
counsel should act as an advocate to achieve that end. Finally, if the
appointed counsel determines that the child's preference is inconsistent with the child's best interests, the appointed counsel must
decide either to: (I) advocate for a result consistent with the client's preference; (2) withdraw from the case; or (3) advocate for a
result contrary to the client's preference. If the appointed counsel
chooses to advocate a position contrary to the client's preferences,
the appointed counsel must notify the client and the attorneys for
both parents. If either parent objects, he or she may move for the
removal of appointed coun.sel.
Counsel's personal opinion about his client's best interests is
not evidence, nor is it proper to interject it as evidence. In addition, counsel must make the client's position known to the court
and, if the court will permit it, afford the client an opportunity to
be heard throughout the course of the proceeding.
VI. PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR DECISION-MAKING

A.

The Search for the Least Destructive Choice

Once the appointed counsel understands the parameters of his
or her role and the goals to be attained, dilemmas emerge. As both
practitioners and the public are aware, "advocacy" can encompass
behavior ranging from the compassionate to the cruel. If the appointed counsel is to be effective, his or her decisions and conduct
must be strategically guided by the goal he or she seeks to accomplish for the child-client. Given the passions and prejudices which
accompany custody litigation, the appointed counsel is in a unique
position to affect not only the decision of the judge, but also the future attitudes of the parents and children toward each other and
the legal system.
The purpose of this discussion is to suggest a practical framework to help guide the appointed counsel through the decisionmaking process. This framework is premised upon the notion that
there are seldom any correct answers to give the appointed counsel
the steadfast and guilt-free reassurance he or she strongly desires.
Instead, the appointed counsel is forced to first ask the right questions. Having done so, the appointed counsel must then examine
the consequences of his or her responses. Through this repetitive
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process, the appointed counsel can hopefully acquire the wisdom to
select the least detrimental alternative available to achieve his or
her purpose.
Every decision appointed counsel makes, from whether to first
interview a child or the child's parents, to which questions to ask,
has consequences. If, in advocating a child's interests, the appointed
counsel's purpose is to achieve the desired outcome in a way which
is least detrimental to those interests, then the appointed counsel
must evaluate the choices not only in terms of their consequences
upon the outcome of the case, but also in terms of their impact
upon relationships in the family after the case is resolved. A concept of representation or advocacy which takes into consideration
the impact of strategic decisions, both in terms of the legal outcome and their impact on future family relations, forces an advocate to consider alternative strategies which may achieve the desired
results at a lower cost to future family relationships.
A litigator's sense of tactics and legal procedure, although essential, is an incomplete tool for this difficult task. For example, if
the interests of the child would be best served by the custodial care
of the mother, and counsel has become aware that the father is involved in a homosexual liaison, should the appointed counsel disclose this fact to the court or to the other parent in order to attain
the desired objective? If disclosure is likely to adversely affect the relationship between the parents in the future, should the appointed
counsel look for a less destructive way of advocating custody for the
mother, such as encouraging settlement negotiations in the relative
privacy of a chamber's conference, or threatening disclosure in negotiating with the father or the father's attorney?
Of course, the ultimate inquiry is whether disclosure of the liaison is needed to persuade a judge to grant custody to the mother.
If the answer to this question is yes and settlement is not possible,
then the appointed counsel is left with no alternative except to
make the disclosure. In such a case disclosure may be the least detrimental alternative available to accomplish the appointed counsel's
goal for the child, and cross examination of the father on this sensitive issue may be necessary despite its potentially adverse effect on
future familial relationships.
Adversarial zeal should, at times, be curtailed because of a
stronger necessity to safeguard and promote the child's long-term
relationships with both parents. Thus, the notion of advocacy
should include safeguards that prioritize the preservation of parental access unless, and until, a contrary course of action becomes
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necessary. The notion of advocacy must be broad enough to respond not only to the issue of legal custody, but also to the child's
total life situation. Although the earlier discussion in this Article addressed the weight to be given to the child's stated preference, 116
apparently most children prefer to be raised by both parents and
their selection of one parent over the other may be more an artifice
of the divorce context than a statement of greater psychological attachment. ll7 Therefore, the child's advocate should take precautions
to ensure that the child's preference is not used in a way which may
jeopardize the continued relationship with the parent who is not
awarded custody.
Appointed counsel in this hypothetical has several strategies
available to deal with this "ethical" dilemma: (1) negotiate with
both parents for a compromise solution; (2) try to persuade the client to change his or her mind; (3) inform the court of the client's
preference and advocate against it, as did counsel in John 0.;"8 (4)
advocate for the client's stated preference; (5) try to persuade a
parent to drop the custody dispute; or (6) withdraw as counsel. To
add to the complexity of this situation, assume that the appointed
counsel is the only person who knows of the client's preference.
No single answer fits all situations. Nevertheless, the most important lesson to be learned from the foregoing discussion is that it
is in the client's best interests to use the information obtained in a
fashion that is least detrimental to continuing relationships in his or
her family, and strategically appropriate to accomplish the purposes
the appointed counsel has defined for his client in the custody
determination.
If the appointed counsel's purpose is, for example, to have the
daughter reside with her father while maintaining her relationship
with her mother and receive counseling, the appointed counsel may
decide to say nothing to either parent about the daughter's preference. The appointed counsel should attempt to allow her to speak
to the judge without a court reporter present, and ask the judge to
render an opinion which does not disclose the child's preference to
either parent." 9
116.
117.
118.
119.

See supra Part V.B.
See Benedek & Benedek, supra note 95, at 154043.
See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
This approach requires a waiver from all parties because a judge's interview of
a child must be recorded by a court reporter and the record must be made
available to all parties, unless waived. See Shapiro v. Shapiro, 54 Md. App. 474,
480,458 A.2d 1257 (1983).
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Some Guiding Principles

1. The Appointed Counsel Should Actively Participate with Attorneys for the Parents
The appointed counsel should actively participate in the decision-making process to minimize the adverse effects of destructive
strategies employed by the parents or their lawyers. Counsel should
develop a working relationship with both parents, the lawyers, his or
her client, and anyone else having a significant role in the case. All
participants should understand that their objections to anyone's
conduct should be brought to the attention of the child's attorney.
Parents should understand, for example, that psychological exams
should not be conducted without the appointed counsel's knowledge. The purpose of imposing this edict is to prevent lawyers or
parents from expert-shopping, which often over-involves the child,
forces an unwanted "co-conspirator" role on a child who has natural loyalties to both parents, prolongs the litigation, and escalates
parental hostilities toward one another and the legal system. If the
appointed counsel becomes aware that either parents or their lawyers are using dilatory strategies, the appointed counsel should actively intervene to advise against such strategies.
2.

The Appointed Counsel Should Take Advantage of his or her
Unique Position to Mfect the Way Custody Litigation is
Conducted

The appointed counsel for the child is in a uniquely powerful
position to affect not only the outcome of custody litigation, but the
manner in which the confrontation is waged. The manner in which
the legal system decides a custody case can be as important as the
ultimate decision it makes. 120 Parental attitudes toward the process
will affect their willingness to accept and abide by any decision
made. Their willingness to accept the court's decisions can be critical to the child's future well-being within the divorced family.
For instance, if a custody assessment is needed, and the parents' lawyers, by design or incompetence, have done nothing to initiate the process, the appointed counsel should actively intervene
and insist that custody be done by consent or, if unable to force
this mutual concession, file a motion on the child's behalf requesting this relief. 121
120. See generally Wolfman & Taylor, supra note 69, at 399415.
121. If the request for a custody assessment is refused by any party, a motion can
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If parents in a custody case become enmeshed in their own
power struggle, the child's attorney should place himself or herself
directly between the parents and his client. If the parents cannot
agree on the style of haircut, the choice of pediatrician, or the correct extracurricular activities in which their child should participate,
then the appointed counsel must actively intervene. Otherwise, the
child's frequent haircuts, visits to different doctors' offices and multiple lessons, games? camps, and church meetings could create an
overly enmeshed, overly indulgent, petulant monster who is a victim
of the lack of insight of the parents and appointed counsel. If it requires the filing of a motion, efforts to work with the parents' lawyers, or the appointment of a monitor mental health professional,
the appointed counsel should intervene to make it happen.
This active involvement is required at all stages. If a parent
wants the last opportunity to persuade the child by being the parent
who delivers the child to chambers for an interview, then the appointed counsel should prevent this from happening. The appointed counsel should deliver the child or ensure that a neutral
party discharges this task.
At trial, the appointed counsel's role is to present witnesses,
control the agenda, examine, and cross-examine to advocate for the
client. It is an instrumental role.122

VII. CIRCUMSTANCES INDICATING APPOINTED COUNSEL IS
APPROPRIATE
This Article advocates an appointed counsel role that requires a
court to consider more than the substantive issues in a custody case
when deciding whether to appoint counsel for the child. The court
should consider the manner in which the custody dispute is likely
to be resolved if counsel is not appointed. For instance, a parent or
lawyer may be using child custody as a weapon in an acrimonious
divorce. Appointed counsel may be in a unique position to inform
the court and control such activity, which may not be apparent
when the custody issue is uncomplicated. In such circumstances, the
appointed counsel may protect the child from the destructive actions of parents or their lawyers, even if the appointed counsel does
not add a shred of advocacy or information to the case. Under such
circumstances, the appointed counsel's efforts to control the process
be filed to proceed with the assessment. See MD. RULE 2-423.
122. This Author has, on occasion, assumed the lead and presented the child's
case first.
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may be more of a long-term benefit to the child than the court's ultimate custody decision.
The courts' view of the appointed counsel as an active intervenor" in the custody decision process would make such appointment suitable to many child-custody divorce cases. For example, appointed counsel may be appropriate in a case where a high level of
conflict or power struggle between parents exists. Such a case may
be indicated by: (1) a high number of pleadings; (2) the presence
of lawyers reputed to attract conflict-seeking parents; (3) the presence of sexual issues, including but not limited to abuse; and (4)
the fact that one or both parents are pro se or have discharged numerous attorneys.
Another situation where appointed counsel may be appropriate
is where a case indicates a high level of conflict or power struggles
between lawyers. Some indicia of such conflict are: (1) the reputation of the lawyers; (2) the number and content of contested motions and hearings; and (3) the number of requests for delays and
postponements.
The court's potential receipt of inadequate 'or incomplete information about a child is also pertinent to appointed-counsel's decision. Such potential may be evidenced by: (1) the apparent incompetence of lawyers; (2) the parents' refusal to disclose medical
histories; and (3) a child age ten or older expressing a desire to reside with one parent where the other parent opposes such a custody
arrangement.
These are just a few of the many circumstances that may make
the appointment of counsel appropriate under the model advocated
by this Article. The examples illustrate how the legal system's view
of appointed counsel's validity and utility can change when the appointed counsel's role is more clearly defined.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
This Author can attest from experience to both the enormous
complexity and vast potential of appointed counsel's role in divorce
and custody litigation. If the appointed counsel actively intervenes
to prevent the destructive use of the legal system or the child during custody litigation, the resulting benefit would often justify the
cost, even if the appointed counsel never appears at the trial table
or advocates a position. Such benefit, of course, assumes the appointed counsel's ability to recognize or predict parental behaviors
which negatively affect the legal and family systems.
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The role of appointed counsel defined in this Article is a powerful one. The appointed counsel is in a unique position to gather
evidence, influence the course of litigation, and affect its end result.
In the right hands, this power can be a potent adjunct to the efficient resolution of custody disputes. In the wrong hands, such
power has the potential· for hann. The following recommendations
help ensure that families derive the important benefits of appointed
counsel and do not become unwilling or unwitting recipients of its
potential negative consequences.

A. Early Warning System
Custody litigation must be evaluated by the legal system early in
the case. If the dispute meets criteria such as those listed in the previous section, then the system itself must initiate the involvement of
competent appointed counsel. If counsel intervenes early in the
process, the chances are better, though not guaranteed, that the potentially destructive aspects of the litigation can be minimized.

B.

Implementation of Standards of Appointed Counsel

Courts should require that counsel appointed to represent children meet prescribed levels of competence based on training in the
field, years of experience, exposure to family law issues, and reputation in the community. Inexperienced lawyers will not provide the
level of competence needed to perform this role adequately. A
mere interest in custody litigation is helpful, but insufficient to qualify the attorney. The role demands a range and level of knowledge
and skill, including trial advocacy, which is highly valued even in experienced practitioners.
Whether established by local or state bar associations, or judicial rulemaking, criteria must be established to insure that the role
of appointed counsel be vested in capable hands. Such criteria
should include: (1) participation in a court or bar association approved training program addressing effective performance in the
appointed counsel role; (2) specified number of years of practice;
(3) specified experience in family law and custody matters, including litigation, negotiation, and mediation; (4) general reputation
for competence in the legal community; and (5) expressed interest
and aptitude.
C.

Certification for Counsel

Appointed counsel should not be certified to represent children in custody cases prior to completion of an interdisciplinary le-
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gal and mental health training program. The curriculum should include the following broad topics: (1) defining the role-what it
means to represent a child; (2) the best interests of a child-an indepth theoretical overview of expert opinion and its empirical base;
and (3) investigation and evaluation of a custody case-the dissimilar approaches of legal and mental health professionals.
The certification should also address practical dilemmas, including: (1) how to interview children; (2) how to relate to the parents in a custody and divorce situation; (3) how to evaluate the
child's expressed preference; and (4) how to prepare for an inchambers interview. The program should offer alternatives to protracted litigation, including mediation, arbitration, and post-divorce
monitoring. Finally, the curriculum should include instruction on
potential ethical dilemmas, including disagreements with the childclient, disagreements with the expert, and problems in appointed
counsel's relationship with the court.

D. Adequate Compensation for Counsel
If counsel is not compensated adequately,123 the level of competence will be adversely affected. The corresponding lack of consistency, dedication, and skill in the role will preclude the court and
children from receiving many important benefits that appointed
counsel can provide.
To overcome this problem, courts should require parents to
pay retainers and to pay for appointed counsel services on a regular
basis. In the alternative, courts should insist that payment be guaranteed from the sale or other disposition of marital assets. 124
Contrary to popular belief, if the appointed counsel undertakes
the task of representation with the viewpoint advocated in this Article, such participation will often reduce the cost of custody litigation. For example, the appointed counsel may perform functions
otherwise handled by parents' attorneys, such as interviewing witnesses and selecting experts. Appointed counsel may also help resolve recurring and expensive visitation issues before they result in
prolonged and expensive contested court proceedings. Very often,
123. Currently, courts have not set any standards for the compensation of appointed counsel. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, however, has
held that appointed counsel for a child is entitled to compensation from the
parents. See Lapides v. Lapides, 50 Md. App. 248, 254, 437 A.2d 251, 254-55
(1981).
124. Alternatively, the state could create a fund for appointed counsel as New York
has established. See N.Y. JUD. LAw §§ 35, 243, 245, 249 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
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participation by appointed counsel will bring litigation to a negotiated conclusion far more rapidly than if the process is left to the
contending parties, namely the mother, father, and their lawyers.
The survey of Maryland circuit court judges indicates that the
judiciary is well aware of appointed counsel's current shortcomings,
but nonetheless remain strongly in favor of its increased use. IT the
recommendations in this Article are followed, appointed counsel for
children in custody proceedings can begin to achieve his or her potential. Children, at last, will be afforded the voice they have been
so long due.
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APPENDIX A
SURVEY OF MARYLAND CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES
In an effort to gauge judicial perceptions regarding the role of
appointed counsel in custody cases, a survey. was conducted of circuit court judges throughout the state of Maryland.
I. RESULTS OF INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS

The present role of appointed counsel in court varies widely,
even within the same judge's courtroom. The role of appointed
counsel was defined as follows: representative of child (43/45,
96%); neutral fact-finder (26/45, 58%); representative of the court
(18/45, 40%); and other (3/45, 7%). Most judges accept variations
of the role of counsel (32/45, 71 %), while a relatively few see only a
single acceptable role (13/45, 29%). Only 11 out of 45 judges indicate they use appointed counsel strictly as an advocate for the child.
The judges surveyed also stated that appointed counsel should
advocate on behalf of their client as follows: by making a child's
wishes clear, but advocating for the child's best interests (39/45,
87%); or by advocating the child's best interests, even if they conflict with child's stated wishes (23/45,51%);, or some combination
of these two approaches.
Few judges believe that appointed counsel should be an advocate for the child's wishes, regardless of the attorney's views on the
child's best interests (9/45, 20%). Indeed, several judges view this
option as entirely inappropriate (5/45, 11%).
Most judges believe that advocacy must be contoured to the
needs of each case, and that to cast a definition of the appointed
counsel's role in stone, is inappropriate and unworkable.
Most judges believe that appointed counsel should rely somewhat on psychiatric or other independent evaluations (38/45, 84%).
A minority of judges would have appointed counsel place great reliance upon independent evaluations by mental health professionals
(8/45, 18%). Two judges expressed a belief that counsel should rely
on such evaluations "very little" (2/45,4%), and one judge believed
that counsel should ignore these evaluations altogether (1/45, 2%).
Relatively few judges believe that reliance on mental health professionals should vary from case to case (6/45, 13%).
Many judges believe that the amount of contact appointed
counsel should have with the parents' attorneys should vary according to the needs of the case (22/46, 48%). The judges did not over.
whelmingly subscribe to any single response on this issue.
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Virtually all judges believed that ex parte communications between the court and appointed counsel are improper (43/46, 93%),
although many will allow such communications under exceptional
circumstances (21/46, 46%). Several judges, however, do allow ex
parte communications between appointed counsel and the court (3/
46,7%).
II. EVALUATION OF APPOINTED COUNSEL
A.

Summary

The responding judges overwhelmingly concluded that an appointed counsel has a beneficial effect in divorce and custody proceedings. Moreover, most of the judges considered an appointed
counsel's work to be either excellent or good. This is not surprising,
given- the selectiveness judges appear to employ in appointing
counsel.
Nonetheless, judges found several faults with the current use of
appointed counsel. Most judges cited lack of definition of the role,
as well as a lack of experience and lack of relevant outside knowledge, .as the primary weaknesses facing counsel appointed to represent children.
Finally, the judges made many suggestions concerning the improvement of the role, which are addressed in the text of this
Article.
B.

Results of Individual QJlestions

Most of the judges believed that the termination of the appointed counsel's role in the case, and the termination of the appointed counsel's relationship with a client, should vary in each
case (33/44, 75%). No judges indicated specifically that appointed
counsel should terminate his or her relationship before settlement.
Several judges indicated that counsel should terminate the relationship after settlement occurs.
Most judges found the quality of representation presently afforded by appointed counsel either excellent (23/46, 50%) or good
(20/46, 43%). Of these, most found the work either uniformly excellent (20/46, 43%) or uniformly good (17/46, 37%). A few had
mixed experiences and gave mixed reviews. A minority of judges
find the work adequate (5/46, 11 % ), and almost none found the
quality of the work poor' (1/46, 2 %) .
The majority of judges found that appointed counsel affect proceedings "beneficially" (39/46, 85%). None found the effect of ap-
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pointed counsel to be detrimental. Once again, some of the judges
found the effect to vary (8/46, 17%).
A majority (23/43, 56%) of the judges surveyed believed that
one of the "greatest weaknesses" of appointed counsel for children
today was the lack of definition of the appointed counsel's role.
Other often-cited weaknesses included: inexperience as appointed counsel for children (13/43, 30%) and lack of outside
knowledge that would be beneficial to counsel (e.g., psychiatric
knowledge) (10/43, 23%). One judge responded that inexperience
in the practice of law was one of the "greatest weaknesses." None of.
the judges found a lack of legal skills a great weakness.
Finally, some judges listed no weaknesses in the counsel they
had appointed (5/44, 11%). Four of these five judges also responded that they only appoint counsel with whom they are personally familiar.

C. Summary ofJudges' Recommendations
The recommendations made by the judges can be summarized as
follows: (1) clarify the role of appointed counsel; (2) distinguish
them from other experts; (3) encourage the appointed counsel to
communicate freely with counsel for the other parties; (4) teach the
appointed counsel to represent a child's best interests; (5) a court
order should spell out appointed counsel's role explicitly; (6) create
a training program for appointed counsel; (7) family law section of
the state/local bar should establish minimum requirements (and
perhaps court certification) that require appointed attorneys to
have practiced family law for five years and to have participated in a
minimum of 20 domestic relations cases; (8) create a list of counsel
available for appointment, including information on specific attributes such as experience, interests, and talents; (9) set guidelines for
the compensation of appointed counsel; (10) create a fee schedule
using factors such as the complexity of case and parents' ability to
pay; (11) make other support resources available to appointed
counsel, such as psychologists and psychiatrists; (12) train judges on
the use of appointed counsel; (13) counsel parents on the effect of
divorce and custody litigation on children to encourage amicable
settlement; (14) recognize the need for appointed counsel early;
and (15) inform appointed counsel of the case's real issues early
on.

Baltimore Law Review

554
III.
A.

[Vol. 26

SURVEY METHODOLOGY
Sample Size and Composition

One hundred and twenty Maryland circuit court judges received our survey. The author received the following responses: 46
completed questionnaires, 1 textual response, and 3 "not sufficient
experience to answer." The data reported below represents a total
of 50 respondents,l25 or 42% of 120 Maryland circuit court judges.
While most judges returned the survey anonymously, we received enough signed surveys, or surveys attributed to a certain
county, to know that the sample is representative of the entire state
and is not geographically biased.
B. Presentation oj Data
The tables in Appendix B indicate the individual responses of
every responding judge. Judges often selected more than one response to a question. Thus, the total aggregate number of responses
often exceeds the number of responding judges.
The two primary methods of reading the data are (1) 'measuring trends in the overall responses to determine how judges generally respond to a given question; and (2) examining trends in individual responses to determine specifically how judges will answer a
given question.
IV. SURVEY RESULTS
B.126

For an abridged version of the survey results, see Appendix
The following is a summary of the results therein.

A.

The Process oj Appointing Independent Counsel Jor Children

1. Summary
The overwhelming majority of judges surveyed employ appointed counsel for children at some time, although not in every
case. In deciding whether to appoint counsel, judges consider a
range of factors, both substantive and procedural.
Judges use care in selecting the counsel they appoint, often attempting to match certain characteristics of counsel with the unique
aspects of the case. Most judges are "very familiar" with the counsel
125. Three judges have returned questionnaires too recently to be included in this
Article. Thus, the total number of completed surveys is currently 49.
126. The survey responses are on file with the Author.
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they appoint. This may indicate that most judges have certain attorneys who have earned their confidence, and that the judges appoint
only these attorneys. This conclusion is borne out by the answers to
question 5A. Judges prefer to appoint counsel with whom they are
familiar, and few will appoint counsel with whom they are not at all
familiar.
2. Results of Individual Questions
Almost all judges appoint counsel for children at some point.
When judges decide to appoint counsel, they do so most often after
original motions and before final disposition. Within this range, the
precise stage at which appointments are made varies: after original
motions (24/46, 52%); during or after discovery (20/46, 43%); at
some later stage in the trial proceeding (22/46, 48%). Most judges
have appointed counsel at varying stages of the proceedings (26/46,
57%), although a significant number (19/46, 41 %) seem to appoint
at a certain set stage of the proceedings.
The following factors most strongly indicate the need for independent counsel for children: (1) the possibility of receiving inadequate information without independent counsel (42/47, 89%); (2) a
high level of conflict between parents (41/47, 87%); (3) the potential for long-term damage to the child (35/47, 74%); (4) age of the
child (27/47 57%); and (5) a high level of conflict between attorneys (23/47 49%).
The following factor less strongly indicates the need for independent counsel for children: the amount of money at issue (6/47,
13%). Six judges felt strongly enough to write in the following factor: allegations of substance abuse or sexual abuse (6/47, 13%).
Other factors considered include the maturity of the child and a
high level of conflict between parent and child.
All judges indicated that they considered a number of factors
in reaching this decision; thus, no one factor is dispositive. The
most common combinations of responses were: (1) risk of inadequate information and age of child (18/47, 38%); (2) parental conflict, attorney conflict, and the potential for harm to the child (14/
47 30%); and (3) parental conflict and potential for harm to the
child (13/47 28%).
The qualities most often sought in an attorney for appointed
counsel are: (1) experience (35/44, 80%); (2) legal knowledge/
competence (34/44, 77%); and (3) the personal characteristics of
counsel (27/44, 61 %). Almost all judges consider a number of fac-
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tors in reaching this decision, usually including some combination
of the above three factors.
Most judges appoint counsel with whom they are "very familiar" (40/45, 89%). None will appoint counsel with whom they are
"not at all familiar." Few judges will appoint counsel with whom
they are "somewhat familiar" (19/45, 42%). Every judge prefers to
appoint counsel with whom they are familiar.
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APPENDIX B
ABRIDGED SURVEY RESPONSES AND TABLES

Question One:
At what point in divorce or custody proceedings do you appoint .
counsel for children? (Check one or more)
Table I
Response
Never

Number of
Respondents

Percentage of
Respondents

1

2%

Mter original motions

24

52%

During or after discovery

20

43%

At some later stage in the trial
proceeding

22

48%

Mter a final decision

2

4%

Other

7

15%

No response

I

NA
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QJlestion TwcrA (Substantive):
What factors indicate the need for independent counsel for children? (Check one or more)

Table 2A
Number of
Respondents

Percentage of
Respondents

Possibility of receiving
inadequate information without
independent counsel

42

89%

Age of child

27

57%

Amount of money at issue

6

13%

Other

13

28%

No response

0

NA

Response

Qy,estion TwcrB (Procedural):
What factors indicate the need for independent counsel for children? (Check one or more)

Table 2B
Number of
Respondents

Percentage of
Respondents

High level of conflict between
the parents

41

87%

High level of conflict between
attorneys

23

49%

Potential for long-term damage
to child from divorce proceeding

35

74%

Other

6

13%

No response

0

NA

Response
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Question Three:
What qualities do you look for in an attorney for appointed counsel? (Check one or more)
Table 3
Response

Number of
Respondents

Percentage of
Respondents

Experience

35

80%

Legal knowledge/competence

34

77%

Other knowledge/competence
(e.g., psychological)

18

41%

Personal characteristics (specify)

27

61%

Other

4

9%

No response

3

NA

Question Four:
How familiar are you with the attorneys you appoint? (Check one,
or more if this varies)
Table 4
Response
Very familiar

...

Number of
Respondents

Percentage of
Respondents

40

89%

Somewhat familiar

19

42%

Not at all familiar

0

0%

No response

2

NA

560

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 26

Question Five-A:
Do you prefer to appoint counsel with whom you are familiar?
Table 5A
Response

Number of
Respondents

Percentage of
Respondents

Yes

45

100%

No

0

0%

No response

2

NA

Question Five-B:
Will you appoint counsel with whom you are not at all familiar?
Table 5B
Response

Number of
Respondents

Percentage of
Respondents

Yes

15

33%

No

30

67%

2

NA

No response

Question Six:
What is the present role of appointed counsel m your court?
(Check one or more)
Table 6
Response

Number of
Respondents

Percentage of
Respondents

Neutral fact-finder

26

58%

Representative of the court

18

40%

Representative of the child

43

96%

Other (specify)

3

7%

No response

2

NA
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Question Seven:
How should appointed counsel advocate for her client, the child?
(Check one or more; also note whether any of these are entirely
inappropriate)

Table 7
Number of
Respondents

Percentage" of
Respondents

Advocate child's best interests,
even if they conflict with
child's stated wishes

23
(appropriate)
0
(inappropriate)

51%

Advocate child's wishes,
regardless of attorney's views
on child's best interests

9
(appropriate)
5
(inappropriate)

20%

Make child's wishes clear, but
advocate for the child's best
interests

39
(appropriate)
0
(inappropriate)

87%

Advocacy varies

9
(appropriate)
0
(inappropriate)

20%

Response

2

No response

"."

0%

11%

0%

0%

NA

[Vol. 26

Baltimore Law Review

562

Qy,estion Eight:
How heavily should appointed counsel rely on psychiatric or other
independent evaluations? (Check one or more; if other than psychiatric, please specify)
Table 8
Number of
Respondents

Response

Percentage of
Respondents

Not at all

1

2%

Very little

2

4%

Somewhat

30

67%

A great deal

8

18%

This varies

6

13%

No response

2

NA

Qy,estion Nine:
How much contact should appointed counsel have with the parents'
attorneys?
(Check one or more)
Table 9
Response
No contact

Number of
Respondents
0

Percentage of
Respondents
0%

14

30%

9

20%

Close contact throughout the
entire proceeding

13

28%

Amount ,of contact varies

22

48%

Minimal contact
Some additional outside contact

No response

1

NA
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Question Ten:
Are ex parte communications between the court and appointed
counsel permissible?

Table 10
Response

Number of
Respondents

Percentage of
Respondents

Yes

3

7%

No

43

93%

Allowed under exceptional
circumstances

21

46%

1

NA

No response

Question Eleven:
When should appointed counsel terminate his relationship with his
client, the child? (Check one or more)

Table 11
Response

Number of
Respondents

Percentage of
Respondents

Before settlement

0

Immediately after settlement

7

16%

Sometime after settlement

7

16%

33

75%

3

NA

This varies
No response

0%
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Qy,estion Twelve:
How do you view the quality of representation presently afforded by
appointed counsel? (Check one or more)
Table 12
Number of
Respondents

Percentage of
Respondents

Excellent

23

50%

Good

20

43%

Adequate

5

11%

Poor

1

2%

Variable

1

2%

No response

1

NA

Response

Qy,estion Thirteen:
How have appointed counsel for children affected proceedings you
have been involved in? (Check one or more)
Table 13
Response
Beneficially

Number of
Respondents

Percentage of
Respondents

39

85%

Detrimen tally

0

0%

Varyingly

8

17%

No response

2

NA

